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Hal Brands defines grand strategy broadly, as the “purposeful and coherent set of ideas 
about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so.”
1
 
While this elegantly simple definition sets the boundaries for a discussion of grand strategy, 
Brands also identifies several defining characteristics of grand strategy which clarify its nature. 
The grand strategist coordinates all the instruments of national power to achieve aims which he 
finds to be in the vital interest of his country, while considering the relationship between means 
and ends.
2
 This means that an effective grand strategist must ensure that the resources used in 
executing a strategy are proportional to the potential gains. From the perspective of the grand 
strategist, a Pyrrhic victory is no victory at all.
3
 Furthermore, grand strategic thinking applies as 
much in peacetime as it does in war, since the ultimate goal is to “link long-term interests to 
short- and medium-term policies.”
4
 In order to meet these criteria, the grand strategist must 
understand the nature of their country’s situation and the nature of any conflicts which it seeks to 
win. 
 Although Fidel Castro never developed a formal grand strategy blueprint or document, he 
made clear by his actions, policies, and rhetoric that he indeed engaged in purposeful and 
coherent thinking about Cuba’s vital interests. He conducted the various policies and initiatives 
through which Cuba interacted with the world in a decidedly grand strategic fashion. This paper 
will deduce the four aims which Castro considered vital to the success of the Cuban Revolution 
and examine the policies he enacted to serve those aims. It will conclude that Castro effectively 
broke the traditional hegemonic relationship with the U.S. and consolidated his political power 
domestically. He failed, however, to avoid trading one hegemonic patron for another and was 
ultimately unable to export the Cuban Revolution to the rest of the Third World. 
Castro’s Grand Strategy: 1959-1968 
 
During the first period of Cuban foreign relations after the success of the Revolution, 
roughly during the years from 1959 to 1968, Castro sought to forge a unique place for Cuba in 
the International Communist Movement (ICM). He rejected the notion of trading one hegemon 
for another in the sense that he often defied the policy of important and powerful allies within the 
ICM whenever he felt that it ran contrary to what was best for Cuba. He launched protracted 
rhetorical assaults on what were conceivably his major potential allies, the Soviet Union (USSR) 
and China. Owing to Castro’s contradictory rhetoric, it can be difficult to formulate a coherent 
policy statement from Castro himself, but based on his words, actions, and ideology, as well as 
the geopolitical situation of Cuba, we can discern four main grand strategic aims during this 
period. 
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Castro’s grand strategy can be assessed in terms of the four main strategic aims of the 
Cuban Revolution. First, the fledgling republic would have to break free of the traditional 
hegemonic relationship with the United States (US). Castro realized that in order to carry out his 
revolutionary struggle, he would have to ensure that Cuba’s basic security needs were fulfilled, a 
daunting task, considering its proximity to the US. With a reasonable sense of security achieved, 
Castro could then address his second strategic aim, one to which he would devote a large portion 
of his time and energy: the maintenance of the Revolution at home. Building his domestic 
political base and creating a stable platform from which to accomplish his foreign policy goals 
was important if he was to make Cuba a significant player on the world stage. The third major 
aim was to manage Cuba’s foreign relations in such a way as to achieve two related sub-aims: to 
protect himself against future aggression by the United States and, in doing so, to avoid relying 
so heavily upon another great power sponsor that he would have traded one hegemon for 
another. That is to say, Castro sought to avoid entering into another hegemonic relationship with 
a foreign power that would force him to act in their interest above the interests of Cuba. The 
fourth and final grand strategic aim of the revolution was the exportation of the Revolution to the 
rest of the world, particularly Latin America and Africa. If the Revolution could be exported to 
the rest of the Third World as a direct result of Castro’s action, he would gain credibility as an 
independent “pole” in the emerging multipolar ICM. This would strengthen Cuba’s position vis-
à-vis the great powers and lend Castro greater legitimacy at home.
5
 
So Far From God, So Close to the United States… 
 
There can be little debate that Castro had achieved his first grand strategic aim by early 
1960. By October of that year, Washington had severed all diplomatic ties with Havana and 
placed a devastating embargo on Cuba. Washington no longer had a say in Cuban foreign policy 
except in the sense that it was a powerful threat on Castro’s doorstep, one whose intentions could 
not be ignored. But the strained relations between the US and Castro were by no means 
inevitable in the short term. They were only partially a result of ideological incompatibility. The 
other part had to do with the way Castro handled the break. 
 A central ideological tenet and strategic aim of the Cuban Revolution was to break the 
traditional US domination of Cuban politics. In his memoirs, Castro emphasizes the influence of 
the anti-US sentiment of José Martí, considered the “original Cuban revolutionary.” Castro 
recalls Martí writing about risking his life “to prevent, by the timely independence of Cuba, the 
United States from extending its hold across the Antilles and falling with all the greater force on 
the lands of our America.”
6
 Castro calls this outlook the “incredible legacy left to us Cuban 
revolutionaries.”
7
 Castro clearly understood that he needed to gain meaningful autonomy from 
the United States in order to pursue his other three grand strategic aims. But this ideological 
desire for autonomy clearly did not manifest itself in an immediate rejection of all US 
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involvement. Castro recognized that good relations with the US, especially at a time of high 
vulnerability, would give him time to consolidate his rule and implement his domestic reforms.
8
 
 Indeed, the prospects for friendly relations between Castro and the US appeared 
promising in early 1959, at least from Washington’s point of view.
9
 Castro visited the US in mid-
April, speaking about fostering “good relations [and] good understanding.”
10
 About a week after 
this visit, the CIA advised Eisenhower that there was still a possibility “of developing a 
constructive relationship with [Castro] and his government.”
11
 Yet during his visit, Castro 
explicitly avoided the topic of potential economic aid to Cuba. He repeatedly rejected generous 
and assertive offers of aid from various US government agencies, viewing them as attempts by 
Washington to reestablish economic dependence after the war. So why then did Castro visit the 
United States? Historian Jorge Domínguez suggests that the purpose of the trip was never to 
obtain aid, since during the trip he made it clear that he would accept none of it, but to buy time 
while important political decisions about the nature of the new regime were made at home. 
Specifically, Castro needed to address the questions of whether to hold elections in the new 
government and whether or not Castro would in fact, ever accept Washington’s aid. Ultimately, 
Castro decided against both, going against the tenets of his own Revolution in the former case 
and the traditional Cuban political model in the latter.
12
 Domínguez’s proposition is supported by 
the later account of Soviet diplomat Alexander Alexeev, the first official visitor to Cuba after 
Castro took power. Alexeev recalls that Castro recognized the need to tread lightly with 
Washington until he could establish a more stable base at home.
13
 How could Castro expect to 
break the traditional hegemonic mold if Cuba was on the American payroll? If he were to fall 
into the same vicious cycle of American interventions through economic dependency that had 
characterized Cuban government since 1898, he would be nothing more than Washington’s next 
puppet in Havana.  
 Once the Eisenhower Administration realized that Castro could not be brought into the 
US fold, probably because of Castro’s own anti-US ideological considerations, relations quickly 
soured. Castro moved to consolidate his power at home, nationalizing many properties owned by 
US firms without compensation. He began to jail political prisoners and publicly denounced the 
US.
14
 On October 26
th
, in an attempt to rally Cuban nationalist sentiment, Castro publicly 
condemned the United States for a bombing of Havana which never actually occurred.
15
 This 
kind of rhetoric on Castro’s part shows that he was more interested in using anti-US sentiment to 
consolidate his tenuous grasp on power at home than in fostering a normal, if somewhat chilly, 
relationship with Washington. Indeed, Alexeev’s memoirs confirm that Castro’s intent in 
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 Since Castro never seriously considered cooperation with the US, an important strategic 
consideration would have to be defending himself from Washington’s growing hostility. Castro 
realized that the survival of the Revolution depended on his ability to balance domestic stability 
considerations with a foreign policy that would allow him the freedom of action he needed to 
pursue his goal of exporting Communist revolution. Before continuing the foreign policy aspect 
of Castro’s strategy, it is important to address the ways in which he managed the Revolution at 
home in accordance with his grand strategy. 
 
Maintaining the Revolution at Home 
 
 From the very beginning, Castro conducted the Revolution in such a way as to strengthen 
his own political position in the Cuban government. Throughout the complicated domestic 
political competition of the Revolution years (1953-1959), he maintained an ideological 
vagueness which allowed him to maneuver freely within the Cuban political scene. His 
ideological “flexibility” allowed him to rhetorically outmaneuver his opposition whenever the 
situation required it.
17
 Over the course of the Revolution, Castro’s relationship with the 
Communist elements in the anti-Batista movement went from hostile to friendly.
18
 Despite his 
later claims, Castro was not always on good terms with the Communist elements in Cuba, and as 
such, it was not until December 1960 that any reference was made to the “first formal 
manifestation [of the] integration of the revolutionary forces.”
19
 Longtime observer of Cuba 
Theodore Draper, best summed up Castro’s political pragmatism when he noted that “Castro had 
never … believed in putting all his political eggs in one basket.”
20
  
This political flexibility, combined with his later ability to suppress access to information, 
was a factor in Castro’s ability to maintain his credibility and re-tool himself as a long-time 
Communist believer. Indeed, Castro himself wrote in 1954: “It is not possible to organize a 
movement in which everyone believes that he has the right to issue public statements without 
consulting anyone else…. The apparatus of propaganda and organization should be such and so 
powerful that it would implacably destroy anyone who tries to create tendencies, cliques, 
schisms, or rebels against the movement.”
21
 Once he announced his supposedly long-held 
Marxist-Leninist leanings on December 2, 1961, he claimed that all his previous anti-communist 
statements had been forced upon him and that he was a victim of “imperialist propaganda.”
22
 
This claim seems harder to believe when we consider that even in 1956 he had a decidedly anti-
communist tone. This attitude, Draper suggests, goes above and beyond what would have been 
necessary to deny his involvement.
23
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Despite the varied rhetoric coming from Castro during the war and in the early part of his 
rule, his actions show that he was clearly not interested in democracy for Cuba. After coming to 
power, he moved quickly to consolidate his authority. By February 7, 1959, only one month after 
coming to power, Castro had repealed the 1940 Constitution, the most progressive constitution in 
Cuba’s history, and replaced it with the “Fundamental Law.”
24
 The Fundamental Law gave the 
executive broad powers to appoint and dismiss members of the judicial and legislative body, 
checked only by a Council of Ministers, who were also handpicked by the executive.
25
 
Moreover, Castro denied the need for elections, and by June 1959, he was using the slogan 
“Revolution first! Elections later!”
26
  He also set about expropriating all independent media 
sources, firmly establishing control of access to information for Cubans. The tenure of the 
previously independent judicial system was removed and Revolutionary Tribunals took over 
implementation of the new constitution. All political organizations were forced to operate within 
the Integrated Revolutionary Organization, a political body which later became the Cuban 
Communist Party, and of which Castro became formal leader by 1965.
27
 
Castro’s own words, as well as his manipulation of the new government’s structure, show 
that he intended to have undisputed control of the political situation in the new government. He 
was able to project an image of control, purpose, and democratic mandate at a time when he was 
most vulnerable. However, it is to be noted that during the first several years of his rule, there 
were times when he lacked all three. But by projecting his authority in such a way, he established 
a political base which would keep him in power for the next half century. Having accomplished 
security in the domestic arena, he was free to turn his focus to foreign affairs. It is interesting to 
note, however, that many of the important strategic foreign policy issues which Castro addressed 
were contemporaneous with his domestic consolidation of power. This correlation demonstrates 
Castro’s intellectual flexibility and political acumen, as he more or less single-handedly led Cuba 
through the growing pains of the Revolution, both internal and external.  
 
Maintaining Cuban Independence in Foreign Affairs 
 
In addition to the domestic political piece of his strategy, Castro needed to ensure the 
survival of the Revolution against external threats. The obvious, immediate threat was the US. 
Castro’s fear of US intervention was understandably intensified after the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion in 1961. As the task of securing a great power patron who could counter the US threat 
became more urgent, Castro turned logically to the USSR. The USSR was eager to provide 




 The main lesson Castro took from the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was that he could not 
rely on the unconditional support of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba and his regime against US 
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invasion. While the missile crisis was a matter of life and death for Castro, the Soviets were 
clearly not prepared to risk general nuclear war to ensure the safety of Cuba. This is reflected by 
the fact that Alexeev reported Castro as having seriously suggested the use of nuclear weapons 
against the Americans on October 28
th
, the height of the crisis. This response naturally alarmed 
the Soviets, who then had doubts as to the reliability of their Cuban ally.
29
 
 It is interesting to consider, however, that Castro benefitted from the 1962 missile crisis 
in two important ways. First, having suffered no actual damage to his country during the crisis, 
he emerged with what amounted to a guarantee by the United States not to invade Cuba. Now the 
US would be accountable to the Soviet Union for any aggressive actions toward Cuba, a much 
more serious deterrent than what Castro himself could provide. Second, the perceived betrayal of 
Castro by the USSR gave him the reason he needed to push the USSR away and assert his own 
independence politically. As convenient this outcome may seem, Castro seems to have felt 
genuinely betrayed by the outcome of the missile crisis.
30
 Nonetheless, he used the situation to 
create distance between himself and the Soviets on the international stage. The period between 
the end of the missile crisis and 1968 would prove to be characterized by harsh criticisms of the 
two major players in the ICM. This period can be understood as a period of experimentation by 
Castro with independently approaching the foreign policy arena. 
 Castro put the Soviets in a difficult situation. As a result of the missile crisis, Cuba and 
the regime were essentially safe from invasion, barring missteps by Castro that would present 
direct threats to vital US interests. For Castro, this meant he could focus his resources on shoring 
up the domestic economy and the exportation of Revolution to the rest of Latin America.
31
 For 
the Soviets, this was a liability. Washington had a historical tendency to view any Communist 
actors as puppets of Moscow. The Kremlin did not want the US to think that the Soviets were 
behind Castro’s overt attempts to overturn the international system in the Western Hemisphere.
32
 
This reservation resulted in the USSR distancing itself from Castro’s actions, although they 
maintained essential economic aid.
33
 After all, the Soviets could not simply abandon their only 
ally in the Americas, the quality of which they were unlikely to find again, especially after the 




 For Castro, the USSR’s attitude constituted ideological heresy. He sharply criticized the 
Soviet policy for its lack of insistence on armed struggle, and its general unwillingness to take a 
hands-on approach in the extension of Latin American Communism.
35
 Castro could afford to be 
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more aggressive than the Soviets; for the US, Soviet challenges in Latin America seemed far 
more credible than Cuban ones. Castro’s insistence that armed struggle was the only way to 
successfully bring about a Communist Revolution put him at odds with the Soviet philosophy, 
but squarely in the corner of the Chinese.
36
 
The Chinese wished to be seen as a more relatable ideological alternative to the Soviets 
in Latin America. They contended that their common history of colonial oppression made the 
Chinese model much more applicable to the contemporary economic and political situations of 
Latin America.
37
 Despite the obvious attraction of being able to use the Chinese as a 
counterweight to Soviet influence, a strong Sino-Cuban relationship never materialized. Castro 
initially looked to the Chinese for economic support, and Beijing did become a major trading 
partner of Cuba during this period.
38
 This provided Castro with a Communist country that could 




It seems to have been the ideological assertiveness of the Chinese which ultimately 
discouraged Castro from pursuing their great-power patronage. His speeches roundly criticized 
the Chinese for their virulent anti-Soviet opinions, warning them that “division in the face of the 
enemy was never a revolutionary or intelligent strategy.”
 39 
 Contributing to Castro’s disdain, the 
Chinese pursued an extensive propaganda campaign in Cuba, specifically targeting military 
officers, aimed at creating support for the Chinese brand of communism. Castro could not 
tolerate the Chinese distributing propaganda in his own country any more than he could tolerate, 
for example, a US propaganda campaign in Cuba. Despite Castro’s protests, the propaganda 
flowed into Cuba until mid-1965. As Cuban relations with the Chinese soured, Beijing began to 
reel in its economic help to Cuba, insisting that trade between the two countries be balanced.
40
 
Ultimately, Castro seriously considered China a viable alternative to the USSR as a great-power 
patron, but Beijing failed to capitalize on that interest because its actions were interpreted by 
Castro as threats to his independence. Still in his independent foreign policy phase, lasting until 




In August 1968, Castro had come to realize that he could no longer afford to pursue a 
policy of rhetorical hostility towards both China and the USSR. Earlier that year the Soviets had 
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severely restricted oil exports and technical assistance to Cuba. This came at the same time as 
Castro cut various economic and technical programs from the university in Havana, deepening 
his reliance on foreign experts. Now isolated from the US, China, and the USSR, Castro was 
running out of options. The economic pressure on Cuba was enough to show Castro that 
economically, he simply did not have the self-sufficient capability. When the USSR and Warsaw 
Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968, Castro announced his grudging support 
of the international obligations of socialist countries that would later in 1968 be formalized as the 




Ultimately, it was the underdeveloped Cuban economy worsened by the crippling effects 
of Castro’s own economic reforms which made him unable to accomplish this aim. As a grand 
strategist, Castro ought to have recognized that due to the nature of Cuba’s economic situation, it 
was simply impossible for Cuba to survive, much less flourish, without the assistance of a great 
power patron. Cuba, up to the Revolution, had never been economically independent, and as 
such, still had a monoproductive economy based on sugar. Castro should be credited, however, 
for his strategic flexibility. Even after settling into the hegemonic relationship, this economic 
vulnerability did not keep Castro from attempting his fourth and final grand strategic aim: 
exporting the Revolution to the rest of the Third World. 
 
Exporting Revolution: Castro’s Final Aim 
 
Castro’s fourth and final grand strategic aim was exporting the Revolution to the rest of 
the Third World and Latin America in particular. This aim would extend Castro’s influence 
beyond Cuba’s own borders, securing a place for himself and Cuba in the history of the ICM. 
For Castro, this was the ultimate goal which would most dramatically legitimize his rule at home 
and allow Cuba to punch above its weight in the arena of international politics. 
 The principal means by which Castro wished to achieve this aim consisted mostly of 
armed struggle. As early as 1961, Castro was sending assistance in one form or another to 
revolutionaries in countries as far-flung as Angola, Algeria, Bolivia, Palestine, Venezuela, and 
Vietnam. . Castro made it clear that he would support the cause of armed revolution wherever 
support was needed:  
The imperialists … are everywhere in the world. And for Cuban revolutionaries the 
battleground against imperialism encompasses the whole world … and so our people 
understand … that the enemy is one and the same, the same one who attacks our shores 
and our territory [is] the same one who attacks everyone else. And so we say and 
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 Castro’s concrete efforts on behalf of revolutionary movement in the Third World can be 
divided into operations involving Latin America and operations involving Africa.
44
 Ironically, 
Castro had significantly less success in Latin America, despite his cultural affinity with other 
Latin American countries. In this sense, he failed to achieve his fourth grand strategic aim. 
Despite the fact that he sent extensive aid in the form of war materiel, advisers, and training 
support to Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala, Panama, Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic, and Nicaragua, not a single successful revolution came of it.
45
 Castro’s ambitions in 
the Latin American world backfired frequently, as Castro isolated himself diplomatically from 
most other governments in Latin America during the 1960’s by supporting the insurgencies that 
were threatening them. His insistence on conducting revolutions in his own way even alienated 
him from other Latin American Communist parties.
46
  
Castro, true to his adaptable nature, was able to make use of this situation by modifying 
his ideology. In what Domínguez calls the “The Rule of Bargaining,” Castro altered Cuba’s 
foreign policy stance so that it would prioritize relations with states friendly to Cuba over 
revolutions occurring in those states. As such, Cuba would use its support for revolution as a 
bargaining piece in order to gain concessions from other states. Using this stratagem, Castro was 
able to reestablish economic and diplomatic relations with Chile, Venezuela, and Peru by 1969.
47
 
This strategic move allowed Cuba to participate once again in the southern hemispheric political 
scene and helped establish the economic ties upon which the Cuban economy so depended. It did 
so in a manner that was beyond the influence of any great power hegemon. It should be noted, 
however, that by committing Castro not to pursue it in countries which were friendly to him, this 
strategic use of the Rule of Bargaining undermined his grand strategic aim of exporting 
revolution. By pursuing this strategy, Castro showed, as he did in his initial rejection of a 
hegemon, that he did not understand the nature of the conflict. He severely overestimated the 
ability of the Cuban economy to survive without the economic support of either a hegemon or his 
fellow third-world countries, and as such had to trade forgoing his fourth aim in Latin America 
for economic concessions which might have alleviated the pressure on Cuba’s economy.
48
 
Despite his lack of success in Latin America, Castro was very involved elsewhere in the 
Third World, supporting revolution in African countries whose trade could be of little use to 
Cuba. In 1961, Cuba sent assistance in the form of around 40 medical professionals to Algeria, 
then fighting an anticolonial war for independence from France. Shortly thereafter, Cuban 
combat troops fought alongside the Algerians in their 1963 war with Morocco. In a series of 
interviews with Castro conducted by Ignacio Ramonet in 2005, Castro detailed the involvement 
of Cuban senior leadership and combat troops in various anticolonial struggles in Africa, 
including Angola, the Belgian Congo, and Guinea-Bissau during many of the local wars in a 
period from 1963 into the mid-1980’s.
49
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In the end, the stakes for the West and the ICM were not very high in Africa, 
marginalizing the importance of any gains made by Cuba. Neither Johnson, Khrushchev, nor 
Brezhnev were willing to pour resources into Africa the way Castro was; all had more important 
commitments nearer to their own vital interests. Castro gained the rhetorical advantage of being 
able to say that he was on the vanguard in the fight against colonialism, but he failed to achieve 
the worldwide recognition and record of successes that would have made him a serious player in 
the ICM. 
Castro’s willingness to become involved in conflicts anywhere around the world gained 
him attention from his third-world colleagues and great powers alike, but ultimately failed to 
accomplish the grand strategic aim which was essential to securing the leading role which he 
envisioned for Cuba. He simply did not have the resources or the influence to affect the kind of 
change he needed to be taken seriously, especially when doing so ultimately isolated Cuba’s 




  Of Castro’s four grand strategic aims during the first period of Cuban foreign relations, 
three: breaking US hegemony, maintaining the revolution at home, and maintaining freedom of 
action in the international arena, seemed to be simply matters of survival. The fourth aim, 
exporting revolution, was the aim which would help to legitimize Castro’s rule at home and 
secure a place for Cuba as an independent pole in the ICM.  
Castro accomplished the first aim adeptly. By cooperating with the Soviet Union, he was 
able to make his own survival in their interest. He adeptly used this leverage during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis to secure a pledge by the US not to seek regime change in Cuba. This guarantee 
has persisted even after the Cold War from which it originated. Clearly Castro achieved his first 
grand strategic aim by 1962. 
 The second aim, not in the realm of foreign policy but essential nonetheless, was to 
establish a secure base of political power domestically. He did so by adopting a new constitution, 
outlawing political opposition, and assuming the powers familiar to most Latin American 
dictators. His success is reinforced by the fact that his brother Raúl Castro is currently planning 
for the peaceful transition of power to a chosen successor upon completion of his own term as 
president.
50
 Castro was able to keep himself in power with broad support from the people who 
mattered and continue down the list of aims. 
 The third grand strategic aim was more complicated. Castro needed to maintain his 
ability to act independently in the foreign policy arena. The missile crisis showed him that he 
could not always count on the Soviets to defend him against the US, although it was that very 
crisis that kept him safe for the rest of the Cold War. Pursuing this third aim, Castro tried to go at 
it alone in the realm of foreign policy. He failed in this effort and ultimately settled back into a 
subordinate relationship with the USSR. He failed because he overestimated the Cuban 
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economy’s ability to function without the import/export relationship of a great power to which it 
had been accustomed since the early days of the Spanish Empire.  
 Interestingly, Castro ended up sacrificing his fourth aim to achieve his third aim, which 
was ultimately unachievable, and which he had given up on by the 1968. By using the Rule of 
Bargaining, Castro committed himself not to support revolutions in countries which would 
reestablish economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba. This seemed to serve the third aim by 
creating wealth-generating trade with other non-aligned countries, but it proved not to be enough 
to keep the Cuban economy afloat. By 1968, he was already committed not to support 
revolutions in the most economically important Latin American countries. He was involved in 
Africa, but his tangible successes were far from great-power attentions and could not produce 
any victories that would warrant his recognition as the vanguard of the ICM in the Third World. 
Our final assessment of Castro should be that he accomplished quite well the aims which were 
domestically oriented, aims one and two, but did not accomplish aims three and four. Indeed, 
Fidel Castro fell victim to the hubris that has befallen many grand strategists of pursuing overly 
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